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NATIONAL SECURITY VERSUS DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S "NEED TO KNOW": AN
OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR RESOLVING THE
TENSION
Rachel S. Holzer*
"Few weapons in the arsenal of freedom are more useful than the
power to compel a government to disclose the evidence on which it
seeks to forfeit the liberty of its citizens."'
"[W]hen everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the
system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless,
and to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-
promotion."2
INTRODUCTION
Legal developments since the devastating events of September 11,
2001, highlight a tension between the government's interest in
national security and a defendant's right to access relevant classified
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Aton and our daughters for their love and unconditional support, especially
throughout the process of writing this Note. Many thanks to my parents, Sam and
Ruthie Salamon, for their constant encouragement in all my endeavors; to my in-laws
for their assistance in our hectic lives; to Jamie Titus for her ongoing guidance; and to
my best friend's father, Martin Paul Solomon, of blessed memory, for his enthusiasm
for the legal profession.
1. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950). The court further
stated that:
All governments, democracies as well as autocracies, believe that those they
seek to punish are guilty; the impediment of constitutional barriers are [sic]
galling to all governments when they prevent the consummation of that just
purpose. But those barriers were devised and are precious because they
prevent that purpose and its pursuit from passing unchallenged by the
accused, and unpurged by the alembic of public scrutiny and public criticism.
A society which has come to wince at such exposure of the methods by
which it seeks to impose its will upon its members, has already lost the feel
of freedom and is on the path towards absolutism.
Id.
2. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (discussing the
"awesome responsibility" of the executive to preserve national security, but holding
nevertheless that the government had not met its burden of showing justification for
imposing prior restraints on publication of a classified historical study on Vietnam
policy).
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information.3  Consider three hypothetical criminal defendants at
different stages of the adjudicatory process: one serving his fifteenth
year of a life sentence; one charged with (but not yet convicted of) a
capital crime; and one beginning an eight-year sentence of
imprisonment. All three individuals are seeking access to classified
information pertinent to their cases, yet the government objects to
access on the grounds that the defendants lack a need to know the
information.'
The "need to know" element, the only bar to access because the
defendants' attorneys have fulfilled the other prerequisites to gaining
access to the information,' remains elusive and problematic. Unless
and until there is an established standard for what constitutes a "need
to know," defendants such as these three remain subject to the
discretion of the court, unfettered by any objective government or
judicial standards; even more troubling, the courts might simply defer
to partisan and self-serving assertions of government agents and
prosecutors whose representations judges often accept without
scrutiny in making access determinations.6
In the interests of national security, information7 held by the United
States Government may be classified' in accordance with the
provisions of an executive order issued by the president.9 However,
classification raises two major types of problems: those stemming
3. See, e.g., Vanessa Blum, A Critical Closing Argument, Miami Daily Bus. Rev.,
June 12, 2003, at 9 ("While friction between national security interests and the rights
of criminal defendants is not a new dilemma, the issue has taken on increased urgency
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks."); see also Samantha A. Pitts-Kiefer, Note,
Jose Padilla: Enemy Combatant or Common Criminal?, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 875 (2003)
(analyzing arguments regarding the legality of continued detention of a particular
suspected terrorist post-September 11th); Siobhan Roth, Judge and U.S. Reach
Standoff in "Moussaoui," N.Y. L.J., July 28, 2003, at 1 (addressing national security
concerns due to the ongoing war on terror as in conflict with a defendant's
constitutional rights).
4. See infra Part III for further discussion of the predicament faced by these
hypothetical defendants and a proposed resolution of the conflict between national
security and the defendants' rights.
5. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text for the requirements for gaining
access to classified information.
6. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
7. "Information" as used and defined by Executive Order No. 13,292 means "any
knowledge that can be communicated or documentary material, regardless of its
physical form or characteristics, that is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the
control of the United States Government." Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 216
(2003). "'Control' means the authority of the agency that originates information, or
its successor in function, to regulate access to the information." Id.
8. "Classified information" as used and defined by Executive Order No. 13,292 is
"information that has been determined pursuant to this order or any predecessor
order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate
its classified status when in documentary form." Id. at 215.
9. The current order by President George W. Bush amended President Bill
Clinton's Executive Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1995). See Exec. Order No.
13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 196 (2003).
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from its philosophical, and those arising from its practical,
consequences. Philosophically, concealing information related to
government affairs impairs important constitutional goals.' °  As
Justice William 0. Douglas once remarked, "[s]ecrecy in government
is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors." '"
This Note, however, does not endeavor to address such theoretical
issues. Instead, the analysis focuses on the most important practical
consequence of classifying information: that a criminal defendant
does not have ready access to information that is relevant, and
perhaps crucial, to his or her case.12
The executive order governing classified materials implicitly
recognizes the constitutional quandary inherent in classifying
information and allows for access upon an individual showing of
need. 3 Although the defendant has the burden of showing such need,
currently no objective test exists by which to determine whether the
defendant has met the need to know requirement. Defense attorneys
are disadvantaged by this undefined term when the government raises
the specter of breach to national security, 4 a conclusory assertion that
is difficult-if not impossible-for the defense to challenge, 5
especially without access to the very documents at issue.
10. For example, the First Amendment fosters vital constitutional values
potentially impaired by government secrecy. See Bruce E. Fein, Access to Classified
Information: Constitutional and Statutory Dimensions, 26 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 805,
812-13 (1985) (exploring both statutory and constitutional powers of the president to
prevent disclosure of classified information to the public, to litigants, and to
Congress). "The first amendment supports the protection and encouragement of
informed public colloquy 'to the end that government may be responsive to the will of
the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means."' Id. at
813 (quoting De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)). In addition,
denying the public access to classified information hinders "trenchant appraisal by the
electorate of the nation's defense and foreign policies." Id.
11. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
12. This situation presents an archetypal Kafkaesque predicament:
[11n no other Court was legal assistance so necessary. For the proceedings
were not only kept secret from the general public, but from the accused as
well. Of course only so far as this was possible, but it had proved possible to
a very great extent. For even the accused had no access to the Court records,
and to guess from the course of an interrogation what documents the Court
had up its sleeve was very difficult, particularly for an accused person, who
was himself implicated and had all sorts of worries to distract him.
Franz Kafka, The Trial 127 (Alfred A. Knopf 1992) (1925) (emphasis added).
13. See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 207 (2003). The individual seeking
access must also have the appropriate security clearance and sign an approved
nondisclosure agreement. Id. For further discussion of these requirements, see infra
text accompanying notes 106-09.
14. "National security" as used and defined by Executive Order No. 13,292 means
"the national defense or foreign relations of the United States." Exec. Order No.
13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 216 (2003).
15. See James T. O'Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure 11-14 to 11-15, 11-33
(2d ed. 1990) (stating that courts usually defer to government agencies in national
security cases); see, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 516 (1980) (holding that
19432005]
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Under a claim of danger to national security, the government can
argue that counsel has no need to know as mandated, yet left
undefined, by the executive order. Because there is no standard to
which courts must adhere in determining the "need to know," the
prosecution benefits from the court's general willingness to defer to
the government in the realm of national security, 6 often ensuring that
the court will deny defense counsel-even security-cleared counsel-
access to critical classified information.
Part I of this Note discusses the government's process for classifying
information, its implications for criminal defendants, and how
defendants and their attorneys may gain access to such information.
Part I also presents the background of the Classified Information
Procedures Act ("CIPA") and discusses the lack of an objective need
to know standard for defense counsel seeking access to classified
information. Part II analyzes the conflict between national security
interests and defendants' rights, illustrating the need for a universally
applicable need to know test.
Finally, Part III formulates and elaborates upon an objective, multi-
part test to be utilized by courts in determining whether defense
counsel has met the need to know prerequisite to access the classified
the CIA's interest in protecting national security superseded the CIA agent's First
Amendment rights); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 353 (1980) (holding that Air
Force regulations restraining speech were constitutional as they were necessary to
protect the substantial governmental interest in military effectiveness).
16. See O'Reilly, supra note 15; Michael D. Fricklas, Executive Order 12,356: The
First Amendment Rights of Government Grantees, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 447, 501 (1984)
(stating that judges often defer to Executive Branch determinations of the need to
classify information); Molly McDonough, Detainees Remain Nameless, A.B.A. J. E-
Report, June 20, 2003, at 24 (discussing judicial deference to government claims of
national security risks); John Cary Sims, Triangulating the Boundaries of Pentagon
Papers, 2 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 341, 377 n.143 (1993) (noting that in New York
Times Co. v. United States the government actually asserted that judges are obligated
to defer almost completely to the Executive Branch's assessment of the national
security risks which the documents might raise); see also Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (stating that courts
should defer to the executive, particularly now since "America faces an enemy just as
real as its former Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond the capacity of the judiciary
to explore"); United States v. Ahmad, 499 F.2d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 1974) (noting that
the district court "took no position on the justification for the government's desire for
secrecy but accepted the Attorney General's affidavit at face value"); Kathryn
Lohmeyer, Note, The Pitfall of Plenary Power: A Call for Meaningful Review of
NSEERS "Special Registration," 25 Whittier L. Rev. 139, 153 (2003) (stating that "the
Immigration Service has invoked the Plenary Power doctrine to support many post-
September 11 changes in immigration law and policy"); Gabriel S. Oberfield, Note,
Press Rights in Peril: The Department of Justice Infringes Upon Press Liberties by
Conducting "Special Interest" Removal Proceedings, 13 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media
& Ent. L.J. 1209 (2003) (asserting that immigration judges are compelled to defer to
the government's contentions that the information it seals is potentially injurious to
national security).
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materials. The proposed test requires courts to consider and balance v
nine factors in determining whether the need to know requirement
has been fulfilled. The first group of elements directly addresses the
government's need for secrecy: (1) the possibility that access may
compromise an ongoing investigation; (2) the government's stated
reasons for denying access; (3) the position and rank of the
government official opposing access; and (4) the age and classification
level of the materials. The second group involves the defendant's
need for access to the classified information: (1) defendant's stated
reasons for requiring access; and (2) the severity of the defendant's
sentence. The third and final group encompasses both the
government's interest in secrecy and the defendant's need for the
information: (1) leaks of the information; (2) previous access by other
individuals; and (3) previous access by defendant or prior counsel.
This Note argues that the use of these guidelines would allow courts
to make a fair determination as to whether individuals have fulfilled
the need to know requirement.
I. A HISTORY OF SECRETS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
The President of the United States protects sensitive information
from unauthorized disclosure through the executive order on
classification, which consists of a complex set of rules and procedures
to be followed by designated agency heads seeking to classify
information in their possession.18 Consequently, persons accused of
crimes may be denied access to information necessary to defending
their cases or to securing post-conviction remedies,19 a dilemma
compounded by the enactment of CIPA, which gave prosecutors more
control over criminal proceedings. ° For defense attorneys to gain
access to classified materials, they must meet certain criteria, the most
difficult of which is proving a need to know the information.2' This
part details the background of the predicament faced by defense
attorneys attempting to gain access to classified information.
A. The Executive Order: Procedures for Classification and Access
The United States Constitution clearly foresaw the need for
government secrecy," yet no official system for classification of
17. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (similarly balancing the
government's "compelling" interest in preventing crime against "the individual's
strong interest in liberty").
18. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2003); see also infra Part I.A.
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See infra Part I.C.
21. See infra Part I.D.
22. One provision explicitly directs Congress to publish a journal of each house,
excluding "such Parts as may in [Congress's] Judgment require Secrecy." U.S. Const.
art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (emphasis added). A second provision states that "a regular Statement
2005] 1945
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government information existed until 1940.23 President Franklin D.
Roosevelt first enacted a classification system by issuing an executive
order instructing defense agencies to protect from disclosure sensitive
information related to "military installations and equipment.
'2 4
Roosevelt did not, however, provide in his order for any access to
such information. Years later, the perceived communist threat
prompted Harry S. Truman to extend the classification system to any
information, not only military, whose secrecy was necessary "to
protect the national security of the United States."26 Truman's order,
which authorized any and all federal agencies to classify information,
directed agency heads to establish a system controlling dissemination
of classified materials "adequate to the needs of [their] agenc[ies]." '27
Access by individuals outside of the executive branch was therefore at
the sole discretion of the respective agency heads. 8
Several subsequent presidents revised the procedures and
requirements for classification, each increasing public access.2 9 The
trend toward more open access was later reversed, however, when the
Reagan administration broadened the discretion of agency heads in
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time." U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. At least one court has acknowledged
that "from time to time" indicates an intention to authorize secret expenses for
military or foreign policy endeavors. See Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 154-60 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); see also Fein, supra note 10, at 806. Furthermore, although the
Constitution safeguards individual rights and freedoms, "it is not a suicide pact"; it
provides the necessary powers to defend and preserve itself. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280, 309-10 (1981) (citation omitted); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 159-60 (1963) (stating that the Constitution "protects against invasion of
individual rights" while simultaneously conferring upon Congress "broad power" to
regulate foreign affairs "to ensure effectuation of this indispensable function of
government").
23. See Exec. Order No. 8381, 3 C.F.R. 634 (1938-1943).
24. Id.; see also James A. Goldston et al., A Nation Less Secure: Diminished
Public Access to Information, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 409, 474 n.324 (1986)
(discussing the history and evolution of executive orders relating to procedures for
classifying information).
25. See Exec. Order No. 8,381, 3 C.F.R. 634 (1938-1943).
26. Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. 789 (1949-1953); see also Goldston et al.,
supra note 24, at 474 n.324.
27. Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. 789, at 29(c) (1949-1953).
28. See id.
29. See Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 Mich. L.
Rev. 971, 975 (1975); see also Fricklas, supra note 16. Richard Nixon's classification
order limited both the number of people with original classification authority and the
scope of the materials to be classified. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 678 (1971-
1975). "Original classification authority" as defined in the current executive order
means "an individual authorized in writing, either by the President, the Vice
President in the performance of executive duties, or by agency heads or other officials
designated by the President, to classify information in the first instance." Exec. Order
No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 217 (2003). President Jimmy Carter later increased the
review of the classification status of the materials. See Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3
C.F.R. 190 (1978).
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assigning classification status.3" The Reagan order also accomplished
increased secrecy by eliminating the requirements that the classifying
government official consider the interest in public disclosure and show
"identifiable damage" 31 resulting from release before permitting a
document to be classified.32 Thereafter, President Bill Clinton
loosened control of government information, emphasizing his stated
commitment to open government.33  However, more recently
President George W. Bush expanded the number of classifying agency
heads to include, for example, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services34  as well as the Environmental Protection Agency
Administrator. 35 The effect of such expansion was to restrict access to
a greater range of information than had previously been off-limits to
the general public.
One common feature of the executive orders is that weapons plans,
troop locations, and treaty negotiating strategies are classifiable.36
The current executive order on classification, issued by President
Clinton and amended by President George W. Bush, also includes
information related to foreign governments 37  and intelligence
activities, 38 among other things.39  In addition, the order provides
limitations on classification, which include prohibiting use of the
system to prevent the release of information that does not threaten
national security.40
Enumerated in the order are the three basic levels at which
information may be classified:4 top secret, secret, or confidential. 2
30. See Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983).
31. The "identifiable damage" requirement was found in Carter's order. Exec.
Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1978).
32. See Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983); see also Goldston et al., supra
note 24, at 410 n.6 (citation omitted).
33. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1995).
34. Designation Under Executive Order 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 925 (2002).
35. Designation Under Executive Order 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 295-96 (2003).
36. See Goldston et al., supra note 24, at 474-75.
37. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333, 337 (1995).
38. See id.
39. The remaining categories involve information regarding foreign relations or
foreign activities of the United States; scientific, technological, or economic matters
relating to the national security; United States Government programs for
safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; and vulnerabilities or capabilities of
systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security. See id.
40. Id. at 339.
41. Id. at 335-36. In addition to these main levels of classification, another
designation known as "sensitive compartmented information" includes information
which has been classified at one of the main levels and is also subject to special access
and handling requirements because it involves or is derived from especially sensitive
intelligence sources and methods. 28 C.F.R. § 17.18(a) (2003).
42. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333, 335-36 (1995). The highest level, top
secret, is information that "reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave
damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to
identify or describe"; the next level, secret, may be used for information whose
unauthorized disclosure "reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the
2005] 1947
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Government officials with appropriate clearance are eligible for
access to classified information, as are other individuals seeking access
under certain conditions.43 Misclassifying or mishandling information
or other violations of the order's provisions may subject certain
individuals to sanctions.'
Originating agencies may attempt to determine the time period for
which their respective materials may be classified.45 An agency head
makes a decision as to the time period based on the expected duration
of its national security sensitivity;46 generally, this period is not to
exceed ten years.47  The original classifying authority may benefit,
however, from exceptions to this ten-year presumption,48 which
include information that at the time of original classification "could
reasonably be expected" to cause damage to national security for a
period greater than ten years, and the release of which "could
reasonably be expected" to pose certain risks to national security.49
These risks include, for example, revealing United States military
plans, national security emergency preparedness plans, or foreign
government information. 0
If the agency fails to designate a time for declassification, then the
materials are to be declassified after ten years.5 However, if an
national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or
describe"; and the lowest level, confidential, applies to information whose
unauthorized disclosure "reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the
national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or
describe." Id. (emphases added).
43. See id. at 348. Special consideration is given to historical researchers and
certain former government personnel under the Executive Order. See id. at 350. For
an analysis of the need to know prerequisite to accessing classified information, see
infra Parts I.C, I.D.
44. The individuals potentially subject to sanctions are officers and employees of
the government and its contractors, licensees, certificate holders, and grantees. Exec.
Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333, 355 (1995).
45. Id. at 337.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 338. Other exceptions relate to information which "could reasonably be
expected" to cause damage to national security for a period greater than ten years,
and the release of which "could reasonably be expected" to: reveal an intelligence
source; disclose information that would assist in the development or use of weapons
of mass destruction; reveal information which would impair development or use of
technology within a U.S. weapons system; damage relations between the United
States and a foreign government; impair the ability of U.S. government officials to
protect the President, the Vice President, and other persons for whom protection
services are authorized in the interest of national security; or violate a statute, treaty,
or international agreement. Id.
51. See id. Ten years seems more than reasonable because, indeed, "[t]he passage
of time has a profound effect.., and that which is of utmost sensitivity one day may
fade into nothing more than interesting history within weeks." United States v.
Ahmad, 499 F.2d 851, 855 (3d Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
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agency chooses to designate a time period, then certain information
may be marked for automatic declassification after twenty-five years.52
As there are only limited exceptions to this rule,53 the implication is
that the president intended to prevent unnecessarily prolonged
restrictions on access.
The carefully crafted scheme set forth in the executive order
demonstrates the importance of protecting certain information from
gratuitous disclosure.54 Publication of classified information might
lead to a chain of events that years later endangers the nation's
security or jeopardizes the government's foreign policy goals. Yet
despite the potential risks to national security, executive orders have
made allowances for access to classified information upon a showing
of need 6.5  The inclusion of such a provision underscores the
importance of disclosure upon showing a need for access to the
information. Undoubtedly, the most compelling cases in which such a
need would be present are those involving persons who stand accused
or convicted of a crime and thereby face deprivations of life or liberty.
B. Practical Implications for Criminal Defendants
The lack of access to pertinent information potentially impairs the
rights of criminal defendants. The United States' vigorous
constitutional and statutory protections give criminal defendants
numerous rights.57 Prior to conviction, a defendant is entitled to due
52. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333, 343 (1995). This provision applies to
information determined to have permanent historical value under Title 44 of the
United States Code, and provides that the information must be automatically
declassified regardless of whether the records have been reviewed. Id.
53. Id. at 343-44. Agency heads may exempt from automatic declassification
specific information whose release is expected to violate a statute, treaty, or
international agreement or to reveal at least one of the following: the identity of a
confidential human source, or information about the use of an intelligence source or
method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source if the unauthorized
disclosure of that source would "clearly and demonstrably" impair the national
security interests of the United States; information that would assist in either the
development or use of weapons of mass destruction; information that would impair
United States cryptologic systems or activities; information that would impair
application of state of the art technology within a United States weapons system;
actual United States military war plans that remain in effect; information that would
"seriously and demonstrably" harm relations between the United States and a foreign
government or "seriously and demonstrably" destabilize ongoing diplomatic activities
of the United States; information that would "clearly and demonstrably" weaken the
current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice
President, and other officials whose protection services are authorized in the interest
of national security; or information that would "seriously and demonstrably" damage
current national security emergency preparedness plans. Id.
54. See Fein, supra note 10, at 810.
55. See id. at 812.
56. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333, 348 (1995); see also infra Part
I.D for further discussion of the need to know requirement.
57. See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
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process of law5 8-a central component of the American legal
system59-and to effective assistance of counsel.6" In addition, state
criminal laws shield pre-conviction defendants from unjust convictions
through detailed requirements for prosecutors, such as demonstrating
specific criminal acts and mens rea.1  In an ongoing case, the
defendant must be able to prepare an effective defense, yet this may
be impossible without access to classified information.
58. U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ... ."); see United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR.
01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699, at *4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003) ("Consistent with
established principles of due process, the Government may not suppress evidence
favorable to an accused that is 'material either to guilt or to punishment."') (quoting
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)); see also Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S.
657, 671 (1957) (noting that in criminal cases the government, whose duty is to ensure
that justice is done while prosecuting the defendant, may invoke its evidentiary
privileges to suppress documents only "at the price of letting the defendant go free,"
since it is unconscionable to allow the government to commence prosecution "and
then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which
might be material to his defense") (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12
(1953)); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957) ("Where the disclosure of an
informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to
the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the
[government] privilege must give way." (citations omitted)); Herbert L. Packer, Two
Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1964).
59. See David Fellman, The Defendant's Rights Today 6-9 (1976). Justice Jackson
once stated that "[pirocedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence
of liberty." Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953).
60. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.; see, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988) (stating that the accused had
the right to compulsory process for favorable witnesses). The constitutional
protection against cruel and unusual punishment granted by the Eighth Amendment
is also vital to the American system of criminal justice. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see,
e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion) ("The
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man.").
61. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2005) (murder in
the first degree); id. § 145.12 (criminal mischief in the first degree); id. § 150.20 (arson
in the first degree); see also Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the
Public Interest 131 (1989); Thomas 0. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability
and Causation to Ensure Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 Wm. & Mary
Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 1, 63 n.239 (2001) ("The requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the privilege against self-incrimination, and protections against
double jeopardy are just a few of the procedural protections that are available to
defendants when the state attempts to assign blame through the criminal law.").
Moreover, Justice Brennan once wrote that state constitutions are "a font of
individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law." William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977).
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Similarly, the post-conviction defendant may need to gain access to
classified materials in order to prepare, for example, an effective
appeal,62 post-conviction motion,63 parole application, 64 or clemency
application.65 Rights retained by persons convicted of crimes66 depend
upon circumstances but can include due process,67 access to courts,68
62. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985) (discussing a defendant's
right to counsel during a first appeal).
63. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) (writ of habeas corpus). There is a right to
due process in habeas proceedings. See Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 428-29 (9th
Cir. 1993). As such, applying for a writ of habeas corpus should constitute a valid
justification for access to information related to the defendant's case.
64. That the right to parole is constitutionally protected demonstrates its
significance. See, e.g., Purdie v. Tierney, 769 F. Supp. 864, 868 (E.D. Pa. 1991). The
court in Purdie stated the following:
A constitutional liberty interest is at stake in the revocation of parole.
"[T]he liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the
core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss'
on the parolee.... [This] liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)); see also Beavers v. Saffle,
216 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting "the importance of parole eligibility"). For
more information on parole from which one can infer the defendant's rights inherent
in the parole process, see United States Parole Commission: Answering Your
Questions, at http://www.usdoj.gov/uspc/questionstxt.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).
For information on clemency, see United States Department of Justice, Office of the
Pardon Attorney, at http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).
65. The frequency with which presidents use their "unlimited" power to pardon
illustrates the importance of clemency. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866).
During approximately the latter half of the twentieth century, the last ten presidents
granted some relief to an average of 23% of all petitioners, nearly twelve individuals
per month of office. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Presidential Clemency Actions by
Administration: 1945 to 2001, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/actionsadministration.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
These statistics demonstrate that clemency is not unrealistically remote for a
convicted person; to the contrary, if counsel is able to perform effectively and has
access to all relevant documents, clemency can provide a realistic, achievable avenue
of relief in our system of justice. See id.
66. In contrast to the modern approach, under the antiquated Supreme Court
view, the post-conviction defendant had virtually no rights whatsoever, as he was
considered "for the time being, a slave of the State." See Ruffin v. The
Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871) (stating that the estate of a
prisoner, if any, was administered as though he were a decedent, since "[h]e has, as a
consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights
except those which the law in its humanity accords to him").
67. See, e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001); United States v. Gaudin,
515 U.S. 506 (1995); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 555-57 (1974); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Wilwording v.
Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Liberty
from physical restraint has always been recognized as the core of the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977);
Bd. of Regents of State College et al. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). But see Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 429 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[O]nce society has validly convicted an individual of a crime and
therefore established its right to punish, the demands of due process are reduced
accordingly.").
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and the right to counsel.69 Even in clemency proceedings, an
individual is entitled to some procedural due process. 7°  The U.S.
Supreme Court has emphasized that "a prisoner is not wholly stripped
of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime."71
Indeed, although a prisoner does not enjoy a particular freedom due
to incarceration, such deprivation does not deny the person a
protected interest in securing and maintaining his constitutionally
protected liberties." As "[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the
Constitution and the prisons of this country, '73 post-conviction
defendants must be afforded the opportunity to pursue whatever legal
means are available.
To effectively prepare a defense or to pursue legal avenues of relief,
both pre- and post-conviction defendants may require access to
classified information. Yet there are several barriers to obtaining
information that may be critical to a defendant's case. The state
secrets privilege, for example, is a common law evidentiary rule that
permits the government to withhold information from discovery when
68. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) ("Since the basic purpose
of the writ [of habeas corpus] is to enable those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain
their freedom, it is fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose
of presenting their complaints may not be denied or obstructed."); Ex parte Hull, 312
U.S. 546, 549 (1941) (stating that the state "may not abridge or impair petitioner's
right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus"). In addition, failure to
maintain a prisoner's physical well-being may result in a civil rights deprivation. See,
e.g., Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224, 1225 (2d Cir. 1974); Corby v. Conboy, 457
F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1970); see
also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding that a prisoner's
allegations of mistreatment by prison officials may be actionable).
69. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that a
prisoner has a right to counsel while pursuing a first appeal).
70. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[S]ome minimal procedural
safeguards apply to clemency proceedings." (emphasis omitted)); see also Duvall v.
Keating, 162 F.3d 1058, 1061 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that some level of procedural
due process applies to clemency proceedings). Clemency provides the public with
assurance that only those who deserve to be punished are punished, and only as much
as they deserve. See Moore, supra note 61, at 131. The administration of justice by
the judiciary "is not necessarily always wise or certainly considerate of circumstances
which may properly mitigate guilt." Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21 (1925). It
has therefore always been thought fundamental in popular governments, as well as in
monarchies, to vest in an authority other than the courts the power to amend or avoid
certain criminal judgments. See id. at 121 (referring to clemency as "a check entrusted
to the executive for special cases"). Thus, a defendant's request for access to
classified information that could maximize the effectiveness of his clemency
application should be treated with seriousness though the government's objections
may be vehement and superficially persuasive.
71. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
72. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 26
(1979) (adding, however, that a convicted person has no constitutional right to
actually be released before the expiration of a valid sentence).
73. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56.
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disclosure would be detrimental to national security.74 In addition,
under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"),75 a government
agency is required to make available to the public information
regarding its methods,76 rules of procedure,77 and statements of
general policy," among other things.7 9 However, FOIA also provides
for exceptions in situations when the investigation or proceeding
involves a possible violation of criminal law8" and when disclosure of
the existence of the records "could reasonably be expected to
interfere with enforcement proceedings" and the subject of the
investigation is unaware of its pendency.81 The most comprehensive
regulations relating to cases involving classified information are found
in CIPA, which governs certain pretrial, trial, and appellate
procedures for criminal cases requiring access to classified
information.82
C. The Classified Information Procedures Act: The Solution to
"Graymail"
The "vigorous and fearless" performance of the prosecutor's duty is
critical for the proper functioning of our criminal justice system.83
74. Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding
dismissal of wrongful death claim against missile defense systems manufacturers,
designers, and testers). In United States v. Reynolds, the Supreme Court explained
the steps necessary for the Government to invoke the state secrets privilege: There
must be a formal claim of privilege, made by the head of the department with control
over the matter, after personal consideration by that official. United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953). The court must determine whether the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, but without forcing a
disclosure of that which the privilege was created to protect. Id.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
76. See id. § 552(a)(1)(B).
77. See id. § 552(a)(1)(C).
78. See id. § 552(a)(1)(D).
79. See id. § 552(a).
80. See id. § 552(c)(1)(A).
81. Id. § 552(c)(1)(B); see also Winterstein v. United States Dep't of Justice,
Office of Info. & Privacy, 89 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (D.D.C. 2000) (denying an individual's
FOIA request where the document sought related to ongoing investigations).
Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is exempt from the access requirements
of the Privacy Act if disclosure might compromise a "pending sensitive investigation."
28 C.F.R. § 16.96(b)(2) (2003); see also Falwell v. Executive Office of the President,
158 F. Supp. 2d 734, 740 & n.4 (W.D. Va. 2001) (stating that the FBI had no legal
obligation to disclose the requested information since it was exempt under 28 C.F.R. §
16.96).
82. See 18 U.S.C. app 3 (2000); see also United States v. O'Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 568
(7th Cir.) (stating that CIPA was not limited to pretrial proceedings), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1049 (2002); Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 830 F. Supp. 19
(D.D.C. 1993) (applying CIPA during post-trial proceedings).
83. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976); see also Martin Kasten, Case
Note, Summons at 1600: Clinton v. Jones' Impact on the American Presidency, 51
Ark. L. Rev. 551, 557 (1998) (examining the impact of a civil suit brought against
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Before the enactment of CIPA,84 prosecutors in cases involving
classified information faced added difficulty fulfilling their special
role8 5 of both zealously representing the government's interests and
ensuring that justice is done.86 By threatening to expose classified
information at trial, defendants managed to place prosecutors in a
predicament: either allow sensitive government information to be
exposed in open court and potentially harm national security, or drop
the charges.87 Termed "graymail," this defense practice prevented the
government from prosecuting legitimate cases involving classified
President Bill Clinton and investigating the history and precedent that the Supreme
Court applied to the lawsuit against the President).
84. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16. For an overview of CIPA, see generally Brian Z.
Tamanaha, A Critical Review of the Classified Information Procedures Act, 13 Am. J.
Crim. L. 277 (1986).
85. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).
86. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2001) ("A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.");
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218
(1958) (noting that the prosecutor is "obligated, on the one hand, to furnish that
adversary element essential to the informed decision of any controversy, but [is]
possessed, on the other, of important governmental powers that are pledged to the
accomplishment of one objective only, that of impartial justice"); see also Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that the prosecutor's interest in a
criminal case is not primarily to win the case, but to see to it that justice is done);
ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 150 (1936) ("The
prosecuting attorney is the attorney for the state, and it is his primary duty not to
convict but to see that justice is done."). The Court in Berger elaborated on the
extraordinary role of the prosecutor, explaining that
[H]e is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so.... It is
as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one.
Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
87. See S. Rep. No. 96-823, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4297-
98; see also United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 975 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lonetree, 31 M.J. 849,
857 (C.A.A.F. 1990); Saul M. Pilchen & Benjamin B. Klubes, Using the Classified
Information Procedures Act in Criminal Cases: A Primer for Defense Counsel, 31
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 191, 195 (1994) ("CIPA was conceived to reconcile the greymail
dilemma, while implicitly acknowledging that appropriate cases might well call for the
use of classified information by the prosecution or defense."). One student
commentator noted that two types of graymail dilemmas existed in which the
government was presented with the disclose or dismiss dilemma: either a defendant
would threaten the government with disclosure of classified information in an effort
to thwart prosecution, known as express graymail, or the defense would attempt to
obtain or disclose such information simply as an exercise of the defendant's right to
prepare and conduct a satisfactory defense, called implied graymail. Note, Graymail:
The Disclose or Dismiss Dilemma in Criminal Prosecutions, 31 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
84, 85 n.5 (1980); see also Timothy J. Shea, Note, CIPA Under Siege: The Use and
Abuse of Classified Information in Criminal Trials, 27 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 657, 716
(1990).
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information." With no opportunity to obtain an advance ruling on the
admissibility of classified information, 9 prosecutors often chose to
abandon criminal proceedings rather than risk disclosure of such
information at trial.90
The effects of this dilemma were not limited to individual
defendants escaping the consequences of their crimes.91 Graymail also
affected the integrity of the entire criminal justice system, as it
fostered the perception that government officials and private persons
who had access to government secrets had "broad de facto immunity
from prosecution for a variety of crimes. ' As it is also more efficient
to prevent the release of classified information in advance than to
attempt to negate the damage caused by such disclosure after the
fact,93 it became necessary to develop formal procedures which would
govern cases involving the disclosure of classified information.
Designed to both safeguard classified information and protect a
defendant's rights,94 CIPA provides procedures which would permit
the trial judge to decide questions of admissibility involving classified
information before the evidence is exposed irreversibly in open
88. S. Rep. No. 96-823, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294
(recommending that the bill providing procedures for criminal cases involving
classified information, CIPA, should pass because it will "permit the government to
ascertain the potential damage to national security of proceeding with a given
prosecution before trial").
89. See Smith, 780 F.2d at 1105 (holding that prior to admission of classified
information, a district court must engage in a balancing test weighing the
government's interest in nondisclosure against the defendant's need for disclosure).
For an in-depth discussion of the government's need to protect classified materials,
see generally Laura A. White, Note, The Need for Governmental Secrecy: Why the
U.S. Government Must Be Able to Withhold Information in the Interest of National
Security, 43 Va. J. Int'l L. 1071 (2003).
90. See Smith, 780 F.2d at 1105.
91. See Shea, supra note 87, at 659 (noting that graymail affected the entire
criminal justice system, and therefore Congress enacted CIPA "[i]n an effort to allay
public concerns over the handling of graymail in criminal cases").
92. Graymail Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the
House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong. 5 (1979) (statement of
Rep. Morgan Murphy, Chairman of the Subcommittee).
93. See United States v. Bin Laden, 58 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(quoting Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 512-13 & nn. 7-8 (1980)).
94. See United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that
CIPA authorized an order prohibiting disclosure of information acquired by the
defendant prior to criminal proceedings only in connection with trial but not to the
extent that it prohibited public disclosure unrelated to court proceedings); United
States v. LaRouche Campaign, 695 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (D. Mass. 1988) (applying
section 4 of CIPA in deciding question of discovery of classified information by
defendants). For instance, section 5(a) mandates that the defendant give formal
notice to the prosecution at least thirty days in advance of the time at which the
defense would like to use specific classified information. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(a)
(2000). Failure to comply with this requirement precludes the defendant's use of the
classified information at issue. See, e.g., United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1465
(11th Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant's failure to give formal notice of intent to
disclose classified information precluded asserting CIA involvement as a defense).
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court.95 CIPA effectively minimizes the risk of graymai 96 without
modifying the existing law relating to admissibility of evidence.97 The
sixteen sections of CIPA lay out detailed procedures for cases
involving classified information as well as how Congress must regulate
the Act's application and effectiveness. 98
CIPA governs cases when the government asserts a classified
information privilege, and that assertion is "at least a colorable one."'99
In CIPA proceedings, courts have applied a three-step analysis to
determine whether a defendant may utilize the classified information
at issue."° The court first decides if the evidence is relevant,'0 ' which
is determined solely by the well-established criteria set forth in the
Federal Rules of Evidence."2  If the court deems information
relevant, then the court considers whether it is material. 03 Once the
95. See S. Rep. No. 96-823, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294; see
also In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 393 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing the history and
applicability of CIPA).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 975 (4th Cir. 1983)
("[O]pportunity for 'greymail' by defendants.., is minimized.").
97. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1436, at 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4307,
4310; see also United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1104-06 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating
that "Congress did not intend to allow exclusion of evidence relevant to the defense
simply because that evidence was classified"); United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195,
1199 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that CIPA does not "undertake to create new
substantive law governing admissibility"); United States v. Pickard, 236 F. Supp. 2d
1204, 1209 (D. Kan. 2002) (noting that CIPA supplements, rather than alters, the
discovery process).
98. See Tamanaha, supra note 84, at 284.
99. United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Obviously, the
government cannot be permitted to convert any run-of-the-mine criminal case into a
CIPA action merely by frivolous claims of privilege.").
100. Ralph V. Seep, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Classified
Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C.S. Appx. §§ 1-16), 103 A.L.R. Fed. 219 (1991)
(analyzing federal cases which specifically determine, or bear on the determination of,
the validity and construction of CIPA); see also United States v. Rewald, 889 F.2d
836, 847 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying CIPA and discussing its requirements).
101. See Seep, supra note 100; see also United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508,
1519 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[I]t is axiomatic that a defendant's right to present a full
defense does not entitle him to place before the jury irrelevant or otherwise
inadmissible evidence.").
102. See Anderson, 872 F.2d at 1514. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
relevant evidence is defined as information "having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Information may be deemed irrelevant and therefore inadmissible for a number of
reasons, such as considerations of undue delay or the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.
R. Evid. 402-403.
103. See Seep, supra note 100. A court may find that evidence is material if it
implicates "very crucial issues, such as motive, intent, prejudice, credibility, or even
the possibility of exposing duress or entrapment." Yunis, 867 F.2d at 620. Evidence
may also be found to be material if, had it been disclosed to the defense, there is a
"reasonable probability" that the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 682 (1985), the Court defined a "reasonable probability" as "'a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."' (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
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evidence is determined to be both relevant and material, then the
court balances the government's need to protect the information in
the interest of national security against the defendant's need for
access to the information in mounting his defense. 'I
Initially, once classified information is deemed pertinent and
appropriate for disclosure,105 the executive order requires defense
counsel to fulfill three conditions in order to gain access to such
evidence.0 6 First, an agency head or the agency head's designee must
make a favorable determination of eligibility for access, which is the
security clearance corresponding with the level of the information's
classification.0 7 Second, the person seeking access to the classified
information must sign an approved nondisclosure agreement. 108
Finally, the individual requesting access must demonstrate a need to
know the information. 0 9
CIPA manifests a congressional intent to protect classified
information from disclosure associated with court proceedings at any
stage."0 Thus, even after information is initially accessed by defense
counsel, the Act provides that a court shall issue a protective order to
694). See also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995) (applying the Bagley
"reasonable probability" test).
104. See Seep, supra note 100.
105. The prosecution may still block disclosure even if access to classified
information is determined to be essential to safeguarding the defendant's rights. 18
U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(e) (2000) (addressing the prohibition on disclosure of classified
information by defendant and relief for defendant upon such prohibition). However,
the consequence may be a finding against the government, the barring of the
testimony of a crucial government witness, or even dismissal of the indictment. Id. As
with ordinary criminal prosecutions, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c), the government is
required to disclose to the defendant the details of its case in order to ensure fairness
in determining the issues, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(b)(2).
106. See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 207 (2003).
107. Id. The constitutionality of imposing a clearance requirement was addressed
in United States v. Bin Laden, 58 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). "The text and
structure of both CIPA and the Security Procedures... create a presumption that the
Court possesses the authority to require Defense counsel to seek security clearance
before the Court will provide them with access to classified materials." Id. But see
United States v. Smith, 706 F. Supp. 593, 596 n.1 (M.D. Tenn. 1989) (finding "no
authority" in section 5 of CIPA "for requiring submission to a security clearance as a
prerequisite to representation of a defendant in a case involving classified
information"), rev'd on other grounds, 899 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Jolliff, 548 F. Supp. 232, 233 (D. Md. 1981) (stating that section 5 of CIPA "does not
provide the Court with authority to make submission to a security clearance a
prerequisite to representation of a defendant in a case involving classified
information").
108. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196,207 (2003).
109. Id. Other definitions of the need to know are discussed infra Part I.D.
110. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4 (discussing procedures to be followed "in the event of
an appeal"); see also United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 695 F. Supp. 1282, 1285
(D. Mass. 1988) ("When it is read as a whole, CIPA plainly manifests a congressional
intent to protect classified information from any disclosure incident to court
proceedings, at whatever stage of trial, other than such disclosures as are provided for
in CIPA to give full protection to the rights of defendants.").
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prevent unauthorized disclosure of any classified materials revealed to
the defense.11" ' One such protective order alludes to the need to know
requirement by stating that the Department of Justice shall seek to
obtain security clearance, at the request of defense counsel, for
individuals not specifically named in the order "[i]f preparation of the
defense requires that classified information be disclosed."1 2 Thus, as
CIPA restricts the defendant's access to classified information during
discovery absent a "clear showing of need,""' 3 a court must evaluate
whether counsel has demonstrated such a need before it will grant
permission for access.
D. The Need to Know
Despite the emphasis on an individual's need to know the classified
information, no clear standard exists by which to assess a claim of
need. When used by various branches of government, occasionally
the phrase is preceded by an adjective, such as a "valid need to
know"'1 4 or an "actual need-to-know,""5l however, there are no
guidelines as to how to establish the need.116 Courts, therefore, as well
as defendants, are left with little direction in determining compliance
with this requirement." 7
111. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3, § 3.
112. United States v. Rezaq, 156 F.R.D. 514, 524 n.18 (D.D.C. 1994) (emphasis
added); see also United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2002 WL 1987964, at
*1 (E.D. Va., Aug 23, 2002) (stating that the "Protective Order prohibits the
defendant from accessing classified information unless he first obtains the necessary
security clearance from the Department of Justice, or other governmental or Court
approval... [and] the Court is satisfied that there is a 'need to know' the particular
information" (emphasis added)); Protective Order in United States v. Pollard, Crim.
No. 86-0207, at 5 (filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Oct. 2,
1986) (providing that any individuals other than those specifically mentioned in the
Order can obtain access to classified information and documents "only after having
been granted the appropriate security clearances by the Department of Justice
through the Court Security Officer and the permission of this Court" (emphasis
added)).
113. Pilchen & Klubes, supra note 87, at 193-94.
114. 5 C.F.R. § 1312.23 (2003) (Office of Management and Budget).
115. 28 C.F.R. § 17.45 (2003) (Department of Justice). Agencies use a plethora of
other adjectives as well. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 1312.22 (2003) (Office of Management
and Budget) ("official need to know"); 32 C.F.R. § 322.5(d)(11) (2003) (Office of the
Secretary of Defense) ("appropriate need-to-know.... NSA's determination
regarding an affiliate's need-to-know is not subject to appeal under this or any other
authority"); 67 Fed. Reg. 48,506 (July 24, 2002) (Department of Transportation)
("[Blona fide need to know."); 62 Fed. Reg. 52,695 (Oct. 9, 1997) (Department of
Defense) ("[Diefinite need-to-know."); 55 Fed. Reg. 37,182 (Sept. 7, 1990) (Federal
Emergency Management Agency) ("[V]erified need-to-know basis.").
116. See supra notes 109-13.
117. Courts largely have not addressed the term "need to know", and therefore its
meaning remains perplexing. See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text. In
contrast, in United States v. Jolliff, for instance, the court held that the terms
"classified information" and "national security" are not unconstitutionally vague, as
they "give the defendant ample notice of required conduct." United States v. Jolliff,
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Even those orders and regulations which provide explanations fail
to define specifically what constitutes such a need; the definitions
provided are amorphous and are therefore of little value to one
seeking to prove that the need to know requirement is fulfilled.
Representative of this problem is the relevant passage in the executive
order on classified information:" 8  "'Need-to-know' means a
determination made by an authorized holder of classified information
that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified
information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized
governmental function.""' 9 The order does not further define what
constitutes performance of or assistance in a lawful and authorized
governmental function. 2°
Clearly the definition of need to know is not only limited to
government employees, for courts may allow access by defense
counsel upon demonstrating a need to know the information. 2'
Although there is no explicit allowance in the order for disclosure to
such individuals, courts may be relying on the "lawful and authorized
governmental function"'2 of assisting defendants in criminal cases and
pursuing post-conviction relief.23 However, the order itself fails to
elaborate on who is permitted to access the information.'24
548 F. Supp. 229, 230 (D. Md. 1981); see also United States v. Wilson, 571 F. Supp.
1422, 1426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that neither term as used by CIPA was void
for vagueness). But see N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718-19 (1971)
(referring to the word "security" as a "broad, vague generality").
118. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 216 (2003).
119. Id. The order further states: "[O]ur Nation's progress depends on the free
flow of information. Nevertheless, throughout our history, the national defense has
required that certain information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our
citizens, our democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our interactions with
foreign nations." Id. at 196; see also Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333, 334 (1995).
120. See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 216 (2003).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2002 WL 1987964, at
*1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 2002) (holding that the defendant had failed to meet the need
to know requirement as mandated by the Protective Order); cf United States v.
Lewis, 743 F.2d 1127, 1129 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing the defendant's lack of a need
to know in a case not involving classified information and describing circumstances
which would evince a need to know leading to the disclosure of the information at
issue).
122. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
123. See U.S. Const. amend. VI.
124. The use of the phrase "need to know" without definition is not limited to
executive orders. Examples include regulations issued by the Department of Energy,
which defines the need to know as "[a] determination by persons having responsibility
for classified information or matter, that a proposed recipient's access to such
classified information or matter is necessary in the performance of official,
contractual, or access permit duties of employment under cognizance of the
[Department of Energy]." 10 C.F.R. § 1016.3(p) (2003). The Export-Import Bank of
the United States defines the term in the following manner:
In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to
the particular classified information or material sought in connection with
the performance of official duties or contractual obligations. The
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Courts' interpretations of the requisite need to know are similarly
unenlightening,"' although one court attempted to flesh out the
requirement in United States v. Lewis.2 6  In upholding the lower
court's ruling denying defendant's counsel access to a pre-sentence
report, 2 7 the circuit court based its reasoning on the following three
criteria .1 8 First, defendant's counsel did not allege any facts to show
determination of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility
for the classified information or material.
12 C.F.R. § 403.10(a)(2) (2003). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission
explains the need to know as follows:
A person is not entitled to receive classified information solely by virtue of
having been granted a security clearance. A person must also have a need
for access to the particular classified information sought in connection with
the performance of official government duties or contractual obligations.
The determination of that need shall be made by officials having
responsibility for the classified information.
17 C.F.R. § 140.23(b) (2003). The Office of the Secretary of the Treasury defines the
term in the following way: "Classified information shall be made available to a
person only when the possessor of the classified information establishes in each
instance, except as provided in section 4.3 of the Order, that access is essential to the
accomplishment of official United States Government duties or contractual
obligations." 31 C.F.R. § 2.22(a) (2003). Thus, with regard to any classified
information, courts are left with virtually no guidance as to how to make the need-to-
know determination. In contrast to these other definitions of "need to know," the
lack of clarity in the context of the executive order is particularly problematic. The
vague definition can preclude security-cleared criminal defense attorneys from
assisting in "lawful and authorized governmental function[s]," Exec. Order No.
13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 216 (2003), which presumably include tasks such as applying for
clemency and parole.
125. See, e.g., Stillman v. CIA, 319 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Cummock v. Gore,
180 F.3d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. Pollard, 290 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C.
2003). In one case, the plaintiff's attorney questioned a naval officer as to the
definition of need to know as the officer used it. See MDS Assocs. v. United States, 37
Fed. Cl. 611, 629 (1997). The witness responded: "The military doesn't just give
access to documents unless you have a need to know, as they say, which means you
are involved with the process." Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in the case of
convicted spy Jonathan Pollard, his newly retained attorneys repeatedly have been
denied access to classified documents which directly relate to his case, as the
government has argued that the attorneys have "'simply not showed any need to
know what is in the documents." Anne Gearan, Pollard's Lawyers Seek His Early
Release, AP Online, Sept. 2, 2003, at
http://www.philly.com/mld/philly/news/politics/6670736.htm).
126. 743 F.2d 1127, 1129 (5th Cir. 1984).
127. Id. The defendant, convicted of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to
distribute, had been sentenced to five years in prison, and after retaining new counsel,
sought reduction of his sentence due to substantial assistance under Rule 35(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id. at 1128. Counsel argued that he needed
to know the contents of defendant's pre-sentence investigation report because
"[u]pon information and belief, [appellant's] background and prior record were not
fully and fairly conveyed to the Court prior to imposition of sentence." Id. In United
States v. Foss, the court similarly held that the trial court should have allowed the
defendant's new counsel to view the pre-sentence report, which was material to the
defendant's motion. United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522, 530 (1st Cir. 1974).
128. Lewis, 743 F.2d at 1129.
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that the sentence was a flagrant abuse of discretion.129 Second, lack of
access did not prevent defendant from independently presenting the
information in the report, which consisted of defendant's background
and record. 3 ° And third, the defendant himself had already read the
report, which he and his prior counsel commented upon at sentencing,
and there were no allegations that original counsel was unavailable or
incompetent or that the defendant did not recall the contents of the
report. 31 Based on these three factors, the court denied access to the
materials sought.132
However, Lewis did not involve classified information.133 The
court's reasoning, therefore, is not directly apposite in cases which
implicate the conflicting needs of protecting national security and
preserving defendants' rights. Thus, despite the government's ability
to classify information at its sole discretion, and although the
executive order explicitly permits access upon a showing of a "need to
know," it remains unclear how a defendant can demonstrate such a
need.
Criminal defendants may argue to the court that their attorneys
require access to certain classified information in order to effectively
represent them. Yet with no objective need to know test available, a
court might reject such an argument without the defendant or his
counsel understanding exactly why the request was denied or how to
prove such a need, even if one actually exists. Part II details this
conflict between a defendant's rights and the government's concerns
for preserving national security. Part III then proposes a test that
fleshes out the skeletal need to know requirement mandated by the
executive order.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. The court seems to be implying that had the defendant alleged that
previous counsel is unavailable or acted incompetently, the court would have found a
need to know and allowed access to the documents at issue. See id.
132. Id.
133. See id. One case which did involve classified information failed to mention the
need to know; the court did, however, state:
[C]lassified information is not discoverable on a mere showing of theoretical
relevance in the face of the government's classified information privilege,
but that the threshold for discovery in this context further requires that a
defendant seeking classified information... is entitled only to information
that is at least "helpful to the defense of [the] accused."
United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Roviaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957)).
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II. THE TENSION BETWEEN CONCERNS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AND DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS
There is an inherent conflict in maintaining an effective system of
government secrecy in a free and open society.14 In the aftermath of
September 11, 2001, apprehension has been mounting that
unwarranted state secrecy may infringe upon democratic freedoms
and liberties in the government's efforts to prevent future terrorist
attacks.'35 Moreover, given complete discretion to determine what
constitutes classifiable information relating to the nation's security,
the government tends to err on the side of caution, overclassifying
information.'36 From the public's perspective, however, a democratic
government should account for its national security decisions when
134. See Edward Lee, The Public's Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on
the Government's Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual
Property, 55 Hastings L.J. 91, 129 (2003).
135. See, e.g., White, supra note 89, at 1087. One student author stated succinctly
that "[t]he events of September 11th... tested the federal government's ability to
balance civil liberties with national security concerns. In the end, national security
interests overshadowed the constitutional objections of immigrants, who often serve
as 'scapegoats during times of crisis."' Shirley C. Rivadeneira, Note, The Closure of
Removal Proceedings of September l1th Detainees: An Analysis of Detroit Free Press,
North Jersey Media Group and the Creppy Directive, 55 Admin. L. Rev. 843, 864
(2003) (citation omitted). In addition, courts may be invoking September 11th
inappropriately due to security fears which may be irrelevant to the decisions facing
them. See, e.g., United States v. Pollard, 290 F. Supp. 2d 165, 166 (D.D.C. 2003)
(ruling that "in light of the current security threats faced by our nation since
September 11, 2001, the Court finds it even less likely than before that Mr. Pollard's
attorneys will require access to classified documents in support of a speculative
possibility of executive clemency," when the issue before the court was whether the
defendant demonstrated a need to know the information contained in those
documents, not whether counsel posed a security threat).
136. See Lee, supra note 134; see also The Intelligence Community in the 21st
Century: Hearings Before the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 104th
Cong. 204 (1995) ("[T]here is no question that we classify too much. It is a
bureaucratic tendency that needs to be fought.") (statement of General Brent
Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor); Matthew Silverman, Comment,
National Security and the First Amendment: A Judicial Role in Maximizing Pub.
Access to Information, 78 Ind. L.J. 1101, 1122 (2003) (stating that courts should review
classification decisions because the government "will always tend to overclassify
documents"). One government official, who had worked for the CIA for over ten
years, explained that the censor of the information usually prefers to overclassify than
risk underclassifying:
I believe that we do classify too much material, because it is the path of least
resistance, and I know that from experience. If I get a piece of paper on my
table and I am not sure what to do with it, I put a confidential stamp on it
and put it in the confidential box.... Then I will not have to worry about
whether I released something that was classified that I should not have. So,
the incentive is to do the wrong thing, and that is something we have got to
get at.
Pub. Interest Declassification Act: Hearing on S. 1801 Before the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 6-7 (2000) (statement of Rep. Porter J. Goss).
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those decisions adversely affect the lives of the same citizens that the
government is attempting to protect.1
37
A. National Security Concerns
One of the nation's highest priorities is-and must be-protecting
those who provide critical sensitive information to the U.S.
government, as well as residents of the United States who trust that
the government will shield them from threats to their lives or
liberties. 38 Consequently, when confronted with requests for access
to classified information, the government often attempts to block
access by arguing that such disclosure would cause a breach of
national security. 39 The government has utilized this approach in
criminal cases as well as in civil cases ranging from wrongful death
actions against manufacturers of missile systems 4 ' to suits brought by
CIA employees for gender discrimination. 4'
For example, in Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp.,"' the
Secretary of the Navy submitted an affidavit establishing that
disclosure of secret data and tactics related to the weapons systems of
the most technically advanced United States' war ships could be
inimical to national security.'43 The court agreed, holding that the
government properly asserted the state secrets privilege." Plaintiff's
wrongful death claim was therefore dismissed because there was
insufficient evidence with which to establish a prima facie case.145
Similarly, in Tilden v. Tenet,146 the government successfully argued
that disclosure of the evidence requested by plaintiff would harm
national security.147  In that case, the plaintiff brought a gender
discrimination claim against the C.I.A. and requested information
related to her claim.1 48 The court held that the Director of Central
Intelligence properly invoked the state secrets privilege.'49 The court
also denied plaintiff's counsel's request to participate in the court's in
137. See Lee, supra note 134.
138. See Kelley Brooke Snyder, Note, A Clash of Values: Classified Information in
Immigration Proceedings, 88 Va. L. Rev. 447, 447-48 (2002).
139. See infra notes 140-67 and accompanying text.
140. See Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1991).
141. See Tilden v. Tenet, 140 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Va. 2000).
142. 935 F.2d at 544 (upholding dismissal of wrongful death claim against missile
defense systems manufacturers, designers, and testers).
143. Id. at 547.
144. Id.; see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
145. Id. at 548. Plaintiff asserted that the missile defense system used by the Navy
failed to repel a missile attack due to the negligence of the manufacturer, and the
result was the death of a sailor who was killed when his ship was fired upon. Id. at
545-46.
146. 140 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Va. 2000).
147. Id. at 625.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 626.
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camera review of the documents at issue, citing other cases in which
courts had refused to grant counsel's request to participate, even when
the attorney had the appropriate security clearance.15
Another case involved a criminal defendant whose newly retained
counsel sought disclosure of classified information contained in the
defendant's record for the purpose of a clemency application. 5' In
United States v. Pollard, the court stated that "in light of the current
security threats faced by our nation since September 11, 2001," the
attorneys would not be allowed to access their client's classified
record, despite their high-level security clearance. 5 ' The court simply
declared that they did not have a need to know the information
without further elaboration.5 3
However, in contrast, claims of First Amendment freedom of the
press have triumphed over the government's argument of breach to
national security. 54 The government has an "almost insurmountable
burden" '155 in proving that the publication which the government seeks
to restrain poses a "direct[U and immediate[]""'6 threat of harm. 57
Prior restraints on speech and publication are, as the Supreme Court
has stated, "the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on
First Amendment rights."' 58
In New York Times Co. v. United States,'59 the Court held that the
government had not justified its restraint on the publication of a
classified study on Vietnam policy.1" Justice Douglas stated that the
information at issue, which he personally reviewed, is "all history, not
future events. None of it is [less than three years old]."'' 61
Furthermore, Justice Black noted that "[i]n seeking injunctions
against these newspapers and in its presentation to the Court, the
150. Id.
151. United States v. Pollard, 290 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C. 2003).
152. Id. at 166.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). The Court
stated that "only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably,
directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the
safety of a [troop] transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim
restraining order." Id. at 726-27.
155. Blake D. Morant, Electoral Integrity: Media, Democracy, and the Value of
Self-Restraint, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 28 (2003).
156. N.Y Times, 403 U.S. at 726-27.
157. See Morant, supra note 155.
158. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). The Court further stated:
"A criminal penalty or a judgment in a defamation case is subject to the whole
panoply of protections afforded by deferring the impact of the judgment until all
avenues of appellate review have been exhausted." Id.
159. 403 U.S. at 713.
160. Id. at 714.
161. Id. at 722 n.3. Indeed, the age of the classified materials is significant, as their
accuracy and potential for damage diminishes with time. Cf United States v. Ahmad,
499 F.2d 851, 855 (3d Cir. 1974); see also supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
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Executive Branch seems to have forgotten the essential purpose and
history of the First Amendment,"' 62 explaining that "[b]oth the history
and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press
must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without
censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints.' ' 63
The Supreme Court, in another case involving prior restraints on
the media in a criminal trial, noted that "[t]he press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism."'" The United States
continues to learn from what is viewed as "the unhappy experiences of
other nations"'165 where governments have been permitted to interfere
in the internal editorial affairs of newspapers. Moreover, with respect
to national security interests in First Amendment cases, Justice
Brennan has stated the following:
Military (or national) security is a weighty interest, not least of all
because national survival is an indispensable condition of national
liberties. But the concept of military necessity is seductively broad,
and has a dangerous plasticity. Because they invariably have the
visage of overriding importance, there is always a temptation to
invoke security "necessities" to justify an encroachment upon civil
liberties. For that reason, the military-security argument must be
approached with a healthy skepticism: its very gravity counsels that
courts be cautious when military necessity is invoked by the
Government to justify a trespass on First Amendment rights.'16
Indeed, courts have concluded that regardless of how seemingly
benign the goals of controlling the press might be, it is prudent to
remain skeptical of those actions that would allow the government "to
insinuate itself into the editorial rooms of this Nation's press. 1 67
162. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 715.
163. Id. at 717. Justice Black's opinion further stated that:
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the
protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The
press was to serve the governed, not the governors.... Only a free and
unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And
paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent
any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off
to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.
Id.
164. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966). "A responsible press has
always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration,
especially in the criminal field" and that the press has "an impressive record of service
over several centuries." Id.
165. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J.,
concurring).
166. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 369 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
167. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
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The unique nature of the press's virtually unabridged freedom in
this context likely accounts for the First Amendment trumping
national security concerns. The government's ability to censor the
media was eliminated so that the press would remain free to censure
the government and, in fact, "[t]he press was protected so that it could
bare the secrets of government and inform the people."' 8 In stark
contrast, litigants who pit claims of other rights against government
secrecy overwhelmingly are on the losing side.169 Perhaps this failure
on the part of parties seeking access to classified information is that
the courts, and certainly the government, view the rights asserted as
less vital than the "extraordinary protection against prior restraints
enjoyed by the press under our constitutional system,"' 70 which has
been zealously guarded by the Supreme Court.'71
When challenged in court, the government's overall success in
keeping classified information secret may be attributed to several
factors. In criminal proceedings, although CIPA was not originally
intended to favor prosecutors or defendants in any way,172 the
government has gained substantial control over proceedings involving
classified information since its enactment.173  CIPA entitles the
government to an interlocutory appeal from the court's decision
authorizing disclosure, imposing sanctions for nondisclosure, or
denying a protective order proposed by the government to prevent
168. NY Times, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black elaborated
further:
The Framers of the First Amendment, fully aware of both the need to
defend a new nation and the abuses of the English and Colonial
Governments, sought to give this new society strength and security by
providing that freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly should not
be abridged.
Id. at 719.
169. See, e.g., Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (precluding from discovery the relationship between the CIA and a British
lender due to state secrets privilege); Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir.
1995) (upholding dismissal of the plaintiffs claim that the government's intelligence
agencies violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting domestic surveillance);
Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
state secret doctrine barred plaintiff's claim against a defense contractor);
Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
privilege was properly invoked since release of the government's information sought
by plaintiff would lead to a high risk that sensitive information would be disclosed).
170. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 730-31 (White, J., concurring).
171. See, e.g., id.; Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). In Nebraska
Press, the Supreme Court stated that "the barriers to prior restraint remain high" and
concluded that in that case, "the heavy burden imposed as a condition to securing a
prior restraint was not met." Id. at 570.
172. See Pilchen & Klubes, supra note 87, at 193-94.
173. The government benefits substantially from CIPA's requirements, since the
statute's notice and hearing requirements "force[] defense counsel to tip his or her
hand concerning defense strategies at earlier stages in the proceedings than would
otherwise be the norm in criminal cases." Id. at 194; see also infra notes 176-79 and
accompanying text.
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disclosure.'74 The government also has the right to move for a pretrial
conference on matters relating to the time of discovery, the
defendant's duty to provide notice of intent to disclose classified
information, and the initiation of hearings on which materials may be
admissible.175
Furthermore, the government may ask for a ruling that a portion or
all of the classified information is not material and therefore not
necessary to preserve the defendant's rights. 76 If the court finds the
information necessary, then upon a sufficient showing by the
prosecution, CIPA gives the court several options from which to
choose in protecting classified information. 77  The court may
authorize the government to delete certain pieces of classified
information from materials which the defendant will access through
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 78 Alternatively, the court
may allow the prosecution to substitute a summary of the information
for the classified documents or to submit a statement admitting facts
that the documents would tend to prove.17 9 Defendants are left at a
disadvantage due to the implementation of such measures which are
in place to protect national security.
An even more potent weapon in the government's arsenal is that
agency heads with authority to classify information are the sole
censors of the materials in their possession. 80 Courts are not required
to conduct in camera reviews of documents in evaluating the
government's assertion of the state secrets privilege."8 ' Hence,
information may be gratuitously classified,'82 and the government may
be unjustifiably invoking the argument of breach to national security.
In such a situation, a party seeking access to classified materials is at a
severe disadvantage, especially considering the high incidence of
judicial deference to governmental claims of threats to national
security.'83
174. The government may exercise this right both before and during trial. See 18
U.S.C. app. 3 § 7 (2000); see also Shea, supra note 87, at 665.
175. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2; see also Shea, supra note 87, at 662-63.
176. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(a); see also United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195,
1197 (11th Cir. 1983) (summarizing CIPA's functions and applying its rules).
177. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4 (addressing discovery of classified information by
defendants).
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
181. See Maxwell v. First Nat'l Bank of Md., 143 F.R.D. 590, 595 n.4 (D. Md. 1992)
(granting the United States' motion for a protective order when plaintiff sought to
discover classified information related to an alleged covert relationship between the
CIA and a particular bank or corporation).
182. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; infra note 205 and accompanying
text.
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B. Defendants' Rights
Before CIPA, the graymail dilemma precluded the prosecution of
many defendants." Under CIPA, however, the prosecution has
gained substantial control over the proceedings. 85  For instance,
defendants must alert the prosecution to their strategy early on in
order to comply with the requirements of CIPA. 186 Such drastic
changes in procedure are particularly detrimental to the defendant
seeking to gain access to information that may be crucial to his or her
defense, as the government controls the defendant's access to
documents by claiming that he or she has no need to know the
information sought.'87 Indeed, as one court noted, "[i]t is difficult to
imagine how even someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet"
the burden of rebutting the undisclosed evidence against him. 8
In cases involving classified information, a court must consider both
the government's need to maintain national security and the
defendant's need to gain access to materials that common sense would
dictate to be relevant,'89 for instance, to a parole or clemency
application. However, there is currently no test to guide the courts in
deciding these complex and fundamental issues. 9 ' Although specific
circumstances may warrant the government protecting classified
information even from security-cleared counsel, 9' nondisclosure in
184. See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944). The Andolschek court, which decided
the case decades before the enactment of CIPA, explained the graymail problem by
noting that:
So far as they directly touch the criminal dealings, the prosecution
necessarily ends any confidential character the documents may possess; it
must be conducted in the open, and will lay bare their subject matter. The
government must choose; either it must leave the transactions in the
obscurity from which a trial will draw them, or it must expose them fully.
Id.
185. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
187. Supra Part 1.D for a discussion of the need to know requirement.
188. Rafeedie v. I.N.S., 880 F.2d 506, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (comparing the
defendant to Joseph K., Kafka's protagonist in The Trial, who was denied access to
information related to his own criminal case).
189. See United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1988) (focusing on three
competing interests in prosecutions of this kind: the need to protect national security;
the defendant's rights to a fair trial and due process of law; and the role of the
criminal justice system in balancing these interests); see also Snepp v. United States,
444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (considering the government's interest in protecting
national security); Shea, supra note 87, at 658. But see United States v. Rezaq, 899 F.
Supp. 697, 708 (D.D.C. 1995) (denying the government's motion to modify the
protective order to further constrain defendant's use of classified materials).
190. See supra Part I.D.
191. As when the attorney is being monitored by a party whose interests are
adverse to the nation's security, or other such situations.
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criminal cases where a defendant's liberty is at stake must not be
taken lightly. 92
The government enjoys wide latitude when operating under the
premise of national security. For instance, in keeping with the trend
favoring stated national security interests over claims of individuals,'93
the Supreme Court has ruled that the President has authority to
revoke a person's passport on the ground that the passport holder's
activities in foreign countries are likely to cause damage to U.S.
national security.1 94  Although courts have acknowledged a
"compelling interest" in protecting the nation's security,195 courts have
also stressed that the government's goals, legitimate as they may be,
do not override the rights of a criminal defendant.196
When considering the government's interest in national security,
courts "must not be remiss in protecting a defendant's right to a full
and meaningful presentation of his claim to innocence."' 9  The
Constitution guarantees all criminal defendants a "meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense,"'9 s  which is a
192. Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained that "the hallmark of a truly
effective internal security system would be the maximum possible disclosure,
recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly
maintained." N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
193. See supra Part II.A.
194. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
195. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980). "The Government
has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to
our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective
operation of our foreign intelligence service." Id.
196. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1107 (4th Cir. 1985) (requiring
admission of classified information that is "helpful to the defense of an accused, or is
essential to a fair determination of a cause" (citations omitted)); see also N.Y. Times,
403 U.S. at 718-19 (electing not to defer to the government even though the case
involved national security) (Black, J., concurring); United States v. Fernandez, 913
F.2d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying the Smith standard, noting that while the
government's interest in protecting national security must be considered, it "cannot
override" the defendant's right to a fair trial); United States v. Rezaq, 899 F. Supp.
697, 708 (D.D.C. 1995) (stating that the government's national security interest
"cannot override the defendant's rights"); United States v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp.
316, 320 (D.D.C. 1988) ("[I]n the end, defendant's constitutional rights must
control."); Ridge v. Police and Firefighters Ret. & Relief Bd., 511 A.2d 418, 425 n.11
(D.C. 1986) (noting that a "Kafkaesque chain of secrecy is not what the Due Process
Clause contemplates"). The circuit courts have been split as to whether to grant the
government's requests to close certain deportation hearings to the public due to
national security concerns. Compare Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681,
685-86 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Constitution limits non-substantive
immigration laws and does not require special deference to the government), with
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (deferring to
a government claim that access to a deportation hearing would threaten national
security).
197. Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 154; see also Rezaq, 899 F. Supp. at 708.
198. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984).
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"fundamental element of due process of law." 199 These rights include
effective assistance of counsel, due process, and pursuit of post-
conviction remedies. 00 In fact, under CIPA, a court does not initially
consider the government's national security concerns when making a
relevancy determination. 0 ' Only after a court decides that
information is relevant and material2" does CIPA require the court to
consider equally the government's national security interests and the
defendant's right to prepare an effective defense when ruling on
whether to grant the defense's request for classified information.0 3
Because there is currently no objective test for courts to apply in
balancing national security interests against defendants' rights,"° Part
III suggests a multi-part analysis to be used by courts in determining
whether defense counsel has satisfied the need to know requirement
in cases involving classified information. The court, when evaluating
the attorney's need for access, should look to the benefit potentially
gained by the defendant compared with the probability of a breach to
national security using the multi-part test articulated in the next part.
III. AN OBJECTIVE NEED TO KNOW TEST
In this era of increased judicial deference to government claims of
national security concerns,205 it is particularly critical to develop a test
that courts can follow in their determinations of need to know. The
need to know standard discussed in United States v. Lewis2 6 is helpful
insofar as it attempts to define the nebulous expression, but it remains
gravely insufficient. The Lewis test is inapposite in cases where
national security concerns conflict with defendants' rights because it
199. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
200. See supra Part .B for a discussion of the rights of criminal defendants.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir.
1994) ("[T]he district court may not take into account the fact that evidence is
classified when determining its 'use, relevance, or admissibility."' (quoting United
States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1198 (11th Cir. 1983))).
202. For criteria used by courts to determine relevance and materiality, see supra
notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
203. See United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699, at *5
(E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Fernandez, 913
F.2d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that "before admitting classified evidence, the
trial court takes cognizance of both the state's interest in protecting national security
and the defendant's interest in receiving a fair trial.... Were it otherwise, CIPA
would be in tension with the defendant's fundamental constitutional right to present a
complete defense").
204. See supra Part I.
205. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
206. 743 F.2d 1127, 1129 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the lower court did not abuse
its discretion in prohibiting defendant's second attorney from examining a pre-
sentence investigation report in connection with a motion to reduce defendant's
sentence and that such refusal did not deprive defendant of his rights to due process
and effective assistance of counsel); see supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 731970
NATIONAL SECURITY
was developed in a case that did not involve classified information.0 7
Moreover, the court's three-part analysis in that case failed to define
counsel's need to know in sufficient detail to provide a meaningful
standard for determining in any given case whether counsel actually
needs to gain access to the classified information.0 8 In the absence of
a clear definition of "need to know," the term remains a factor by
which the government can circumvent CIPA, manipulate the courts,
and potentially violate the rights of criminal defendants.0 9
A. An Objective Need to Know Test
A thorough, objective test is needed in order to ensure equitable
and concrete reasoning in cases where a defendant's attorney seeks
access to classified information. After counsel has obtained the
appropriate level of security clearance and has signed the approved
non disclosure documents, 210 a court should balance211 the following
three groups of factors: those which impact directly upon the
government's need for secrecy, those relating primarily to the
defendant's need for access to the classified information, and the
factors affecting both the need for secrecy and the defendant's "need
to know." Part III.A expands upon the three-part analysis which, if
utilized by courts, would lead to a fair determination of defense
counsel's need to know 12 while respecting the government's concerns
for protecting national security.213
1. Factors Directly Addressing the Government's Interest in National
Security
a. The Possibility that Access May Compromise an Ongoing
Investigation
The most important element to be considered by a court is the
probability that access by security-cleared counsel will compromise an
ongoing investigation. The concerns are heightened in any case when
the government's investigation is ongoing, because the accuracy of the
classified information "increases the possibility that unauthorized
disclosures might place additional lives in danger., 214 Although this
207. See Lewis, 743 F.2d at 1128-29.
208. See id.; supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 17.
212. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 207 (2003). See supra Part I.D for a
discussion of the need to know prerequisite to accessing classified information.
213. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
214. See United States v. Bin Laden, 58 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see
also supra note 161.
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fact alone is not sufficient to deny access to a security-cleared
attorney, the increased risk of danger in an ongoing investigation
warrants greater protection of the classified information sought than
information which cannot possibly impair such an investigation.
Congress has also acknowledged the significance of protecting
information that is presently pertinent to ongoing proceedings. Under
FOIA, there are exceptions to the requirements to disclose
information relating to the methods and rules of government
organizations in order to protect an ongoing investigation.215 The
Central Records System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is
similarly exempt from certain access requirements in cases where
disclosure might compromise a "pending sensitive investigation." '216
Thus, a court would be justified in denying a defendant access to
classified materials if it determines that an ongoing investigation likely
will be compromised as a result of granting access, even if those
making the request are security-cleared attorneys.
If the government can show that access would be harmful to an
ongoing investigation, then this factor would weigh heavily against
granting access to the classified materials at issue. Ordinarily the
danger of compromising an investigation would be low, because a
court is evaluating access by a security-cleared attorney. The
government therefore has the burden of showing that access by this
attorney would compromise a current investigation. As the right of
access must be balanced against the interest in conducting a criminal
investigation, this factor should be accorded significant weight in cases
when the government can show that access would be to the detriment
of an ongoing investigation.
b. The Government's Stated Reasons for Denying Access
Next, a court should take into account the government's stated
reasons for denying access to the defendant. These reasons must not
be vague and speculative; they must be based on information which
tends to prove that there in fact is no need to know. Rather than
being permitted to invoke generalized assertions about the theoretical
incremental risk of inadvertent disclosure if even one more person is
allowed access, the government must show specific, identifiable
damage217 that disclosure to this particular security-cleared attorney
would pose to national security.
A court should evaluate very carefully the government's alleged
justification for denying defense counsel access to pertinent
information, as the defendant is potentially stripped of life or liberty
as a result of a court's deference to the government. However, this
215. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
216. 28 C.F.R. § 16.96(b)(2) (2003); see also supra note 81.
217. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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element of the test would not be sufficiently compelling to tip the
scale substantially unless the government's stated reason would defeat
the defense attorney's security clearance. Were the government to
have a basis for questioning the attorney's trustworthiness despite his
or her security clearance, this factor may be weighted heavily on the
side of denying access to the classified materials. Absent such a
justification, however, the government's stated reason should not be a
crucial factor when balancing the elements of the test, because the
attorney is presumed trustworthy by 'the fact of his or her security
clearance.
c. The Position and Rank of the Government Official Opposing
Access
A court should also consider the position and rank of the official in
the government, if any, who is opposing access to the classified
information. For instance, the Secretary of State's opposition should
be given more weight than that of a lower-ranking bureaucrat or, even
worse, an unidentified government employee whose views are
communicated to a court by government counsel without specific
attribution. It would be unjust for a court to ignore the status of the
individual opposing access and to keep anonymous the face of the
official who is opposing the defendant's interests.
218
For a court to view equally the challenges by any government
official regardless of rank would be unfair, as there is a hierarchy in
every government agency. Thus, an objection "from a government
agency" may mean that opposition to access comes from merely a
low-level bureaucrat, perhaps only a case agent. If justified in
opposing access, the agent should be able to successfully convince his
or her superior-who presumably has access to the same materials as
the subordinate-to intervene for the sake of protecting national
security.219 Thus, if the agent is unsuccessful in convincing an official
218. As the stakes are so high for the defendant, the court also should require the
government either to identify exactly who objects to access, or to withdraw the
objection. See United States v. 2323 Charms Rd., 946 F.2d 437, 445 (6th Cir.
1991) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting) (noting the similarities in that case to Kafka's The
Trial, and asking how the defendant is expected to reply to charges "when the case
against him is based on unknown sources, unidentified people and an undescribed
investigation"); see also Kafka, supra note 12, at 12 ("[T]hough I am accused of
something, I cannot recall the slightest offense that might be charged against me. But
that even is of minor importance, the real question is, who accuses me?" (emphasis
added)). The government official opposing access-not government counsel-
therefore should be required to submit a detailed affidavit to the court stating in
specific terms and on the basis of first-hand knowledge why access should be denied.
219. Cf Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) ("To invoke the state
secrets privilege, a formal claim of privilege must be 'lodged by the head of the
department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration [of
the evidence] by that officer."' (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1953) (alteration in original)); see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
2005] 1973
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
with greater stature and authority to deny access and only submits his
or her own opposition to granting access, such a lack of agency
support likely indicates that the agent's position is untenable, even if
the agent is intimately involved with the details of the case.
However, a court should not give great weight to this particular
factor when balancing the elements. Even opposition from a high-
level government official should not necessarily preclude access by a
security-cleared attorney who is seeking to effectively represent his
client. If the government were justified in believing that disclosure to
this attorney would pose a risk to national security, then the attorney
should never have been granted security clearance to begin with. Yet
the official's rank is worth considering nonetheless, as a court should
take into account the source of the opposition to access.
d. The Age and Classification of the Materials
The age of the classified materials in question should be considered
as well. Information that is current and still poses a direct risk to
national security should be protected more vigilantly than older, more
obsolete materials which are of virtually no use to those who seek to
harm the nation.22 A court should evaluate the defendant's request
while bearing in mind that the information once deemed potentially
harmful to national security may now be completely benign. Any
considerations of national security interests must "be viewed in the
light of circumstances as they exist at the time the request for
disclosure is made-not when the affidavit was prepared or the
material filed with the court," '21 as older information may be rendered
virtually harmless with the mere passage of time.22
Under the applicable executive order, there is a general
presumption that certain information should be declassified after ten
years.2 3 This provision indicates that, ordinarily, information does
not retain its potential for damage beyond that period of time. Where
access to such older information would be helpful to the defense, the
government should have the burden of persuading a court that the
documents are still worthy of protection for national security
purposes.
If the information is not older than ten years, then the burden of
proving that the information is obsolete should rest on the defendant,
and a court should still consider defense counsel's good faith claim of
need and earnestly assess the other factors in this test. There is
authority for holding that even information which is older than three
years and which does not relate to future events is worthy of lesser
220. See supra note 51.
221. United States v. Ahmad, 499 F.2d 851, 855 (3d Cir. 1974).
222. See id.
223. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
1974 [Vol. 73
NATIONAL SECURITY
protection than information which is newer and therefore remains
currently viable.2 4
A court should also consider the classification level of the materials
in determining whether access should be granted.225 Information in
the highest classification category-top secret-should receive greater
protection than information in the lower categories of secret or
confidential. To the extent different portions of the documents at
issue contain information in different classification categories, a court
should evaluate each portion of the documents separately.
Indeed, the government, which has a legitimate interest in
protecting national security, may be justified in attempting to protect
the information sought from unnecessary disclosure, even to security-
cleared attorneys. The level of classification, therefore, is worth
considering, as the greater the sensitivity of the materials, the greater
the protection necessary for the materials. However, the fact of
security clearance demonstrates that counsel may be trusted with
materials which fall under the classification level at issue. Thus, a
court should take into account the level of classification but should
not accord it significant weight.
2. Factors Directly Relating to Defendant's Need for Access
a. Defendant's Stated Reasons for Requiring Access
A court should consider whether the reasons stated by the defense
for access constitute a bona fide purpose. As classified information is
not discoverable on a showing of purely theoretical relevance where
the government asserts a classified information privilege,2 6 it is both
reasonable and necessary for a court to require the defense to state
grounds for requiring access to the classified information.
A concrete, plausible reason should suffice, because access to the
information may lead the defendant to information which can be of
immeasurable value to his or her case. For instance, a plan to prepare
a parole or clemency application on behalf of a client,227 or to apply
for a writ of habeas corpus 228 would constitute a legitimate rationale
for requiring access to the classified information, thereby satisfying
this element of the test. This fact should substantially impact the
balance of the factors. However, if the reason stated is clearly
224. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 722 n.3 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); see also supra text accompanying note 161.
225. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. Counsel must have the
appropriate clearance level, of course, in order for the court to continue its analysis.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 133.
227. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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conjectural or a fishing expedition, such as an attorney seeking access
to materials which are not directly related to a client's case, then a
court could find that this element has not been satisfied and that it
would weigh against granting access.
b. The Severity of the Defendant's Sentence
A court should note the severity of the sentence before proceeding
with its analysis of whether defense counsel has demonstrated a "need
to know." A defendant sentenced to life in prison, for instance, has a
greater need than one sentenced to probation, because the liberty
interest in the first instance is so much greater.
A court should accord substantial weight to this factor-whether or
not it is in the defendant's favor-as it directly affects the degree of
urgency required in addressing the request for access. A defendant on
death row, therefore, would benefit most from this factor. For an
individual facing only a year in prison, this factor could weigh solidly
on the side of denying access. In cases where the defendant has a less
extreme sentence, a court must look to the totality of the
circumstances to determine the role of this factor.
3. Factors Encompassing the Conflicting Needs for Secrecy and
Access
a. Leaks of the Information
A court should also consider whether government personnel have
leaked any of the information sought by the defendant 29 and whether
such leaks have harmed the defendant's interests.230 A prosecutor has
a duty to refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a
"substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the
accused.'231  Furthermore, the prosecutor must also attempt to
229. See Pilon v. United States Dep't of Justice, 796 F. Supp. 7, 8 n.1 (D.D.C. 1992)
("To 'leak' is synonymous... with divulge, disclose, make public. In Washington
parlance, it is usually thought of as the surreptitious disclosure of information to the
press for political or bureaucratic advantage." (citation omitted)).
230. See, e.g., id. at 9 ("[I]n actions reminiscent of Franz Kafka's novel The Trial,
Department of Justice officials leaked confidential information concerning plaintiff
with considerable abandon, while at the same time plaintiff was told that he could not
be allowed access to the facts underlying the investigation the government had
conducted of him." (internal citations omitted)).
231. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.8(f) (2003) (supplementing Rule 3.6,
which prohibits extra-judicial statements which have a "substantial likelihood of
prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding"). Id. cmt. 5. A prosecutor's extra-judicial
statements, in the context of a criminal prosecution, can also create the problem of
increasing public condemnation of the defendant. See id. Therefore, prosecutors are
expected to "avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and
have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused." Id.
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prevent others associated with the government in a criminal case from
making not only damaging statements,232 but also statements which
have a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding in the matter., 233 As these rules refer to "a
criminal case, '"234 government officials should be held to this standard
not only for pre-conviction defendants, but also for defendants
seeking post-conviction relief.
This factor should be accorded substantial weight when a court
balances the elements. The potential damage caused by a leak could
be devastating to a defendant, as the presumably negative light in
which the defendant is portrayed gives an unfair and incomplete
picture of the defendant's situation, bolstered by the fact that the
information is classified and thus carries imprimatur of legitimacy.
The defendant's attorney must be allowed to access the relevant
materials in order to combat destructive and incomplete statements, if
only to state that he or she has viewed the relevant documents and
that they do not say what some claim, thereby attempting to negate
the public relations damage incurred by the defendant.
b. Previous Access by Other Individuals
A court should look next at whether the government has allowed
other individuals to access the information at issue, and if so, how
many others and under what circumstances. Assuming the
information is primarily related to the defendant's case, this factor
should be given substantial weight if others have accessed the same
classified material.
As a practical matter in most cases, the usual reasons for anyone to
access a prisoner's court record, for example, would be in connection
with some post-conviction remedy that the prisoner is seeking, such as
parole, habeas corpus, or clemency. If even one person in the
government has a need to know the contents of the prisoner's record
in order to oppose a post-conviction remedy, it is unfair to deny
defense counsel access to the same record on the ground that counsel
has no need to know when the defense attorney wishes to use the
information in favor of the prisoner in the very same context.
c. Previous Access by Defendant or Prior Counsel
If the defendant or prior counsel has previously been afforded
access to the materials in question, that fact should point in the
232. See id. R. 3.8(f).
233. Id. R. 3.6(a). Exceptions to these rules include requesting assistance in
obtaining necessary evidence and information and warning the public of danger
concerning the behavior of the individual involved. Id. R. 3.6(b).
234. Id. R. 3.8.
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direction of allowing new counsel similar access. The earlier
disclosure indicates that the government was not as concerned about
the secrecy of the materials as it might be about materials that have
never been disclosed to anyone outside of government circles. Thus,
the fact of prior access should militate in favor of subsequent access.
Moreover, at least one court has implied that there is even more
reason to allow new counsel access if previous counsel was less than
competent or is now unavailable or if the defendant either no longer
remembers the contents of the documents or never understood
them.2 3
5
B. Balancing the Factors
After determining each factor independently, a court should weigh
the ten factors against one another.236  A court must engage in a
"difficult and sensitive balancing process, ' 237 as no single part of the
test is dispositive in the analysis.238 If, taken together, several of the
elements weigh heavily on the side of denying access to the defendant,
then a court may decide in favor of the government's claim that the
need to know requirement has not been fulfilled. Conversely, if
numerous factors favor granting access, then a court should grant the
defendant's request for access to the classified materials at issue. In
each case, a court should consider the elements individually and,
under the specific circumstances of the case at hand, evaluate whether
some are more important than others.
A court can apply the proposed multi-part test in any case when
security-cleared defense counsel seeks access to relevant classified
information. The tension between the government's need to maintain
national security and the defendant's right to gain access to relevant
materials is manifested in the introductory hypothetical cases of the
three defendants whose security-cleared attorneys are seeking access
to classified information related to their respective cases. In each
instance, the government would argue that allowing the defendant's
attorney to gain access to this information poses an unnecessary risk
to national security. The defendant would maintain that his attorney
235. See United States v. Lewis, 743 F.2d 1127, 1129 (5th Cir. 1984); see also supra
notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972) (utilizing a multi-part test
to determine whether the defendant had been deprived of due process); see also supra
note 17.
237. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
238. See id. The Supreme Court stated:
We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary
or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy
trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with
such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no
talismanic qualities ....
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poses no threat whatsoever, as evidenced by the attorney's
government-issued security clearance. The following scenarios use
these hypothetical defendants to illustrate the types of cases in which
a court must evaluate the defense counsel's need to know and suggest
how a court should weigh the government's interest in national
security against a defendant's rights.
1. Defendant #1
John Allen,239 convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage, is
currently serving the fifteenth year of his life sentence. Classified
portions of Allen's court record contain unsubstantiated allegations
by a high-level government official that Allen had committed "the
crime of the century" and consequently cost the United States
numerous human lives as well as many millions of dollars in damage
control. In addition, a government official declared to the media, "if
you only knew what I knew, you would agree that this prisoner should
not be granted clemency," and gave an example from the classified
record of the damage that Allen allegedly caused.
Allen's newly-retained attorney has never viewed the documents
containing these allegations, as he did not represent Allen in the
underlying criminal case. Both the defendant and his original
attorney viewed the materials at issue years ago; however, previous
counsel is unavailable, and Allen does not recall the contents of the
documents after so many years. Allen's current counsel requests
access to his complete court record in order to prepare a clemency
application that properly addresses the entire record. If Allen's
newly-retained counsel were not privy to these classified statements, it
would be impossible for him to prepare a complete-or effective-
application for executive clemency, because the government official
evaluating Allen's clemency application would presumably have
access to his entire court record.2 ° Thus, omitting from the clemency
application an argument rebutting the allegations in Allen's record
would make for an unpersuasive application, which would most likely
result in a denial of his request for clemency.
The court is faced with the question of whether Allen's attorney has
demonstrated a need to know the information requested. To grant
access without considering the potential risks to national security
239. The names of all three defendants in this part are a product of the author's
imagination.
240. See 28 C.F.R. § 1.6 (2003). The applicable rule states:
Upon receipt of a petition for executive clemency, the Attorney General
shall cause such investigation to be made of the matter as he or she may
deem necessary and appropriate, using the services of, or obtaining reports
from, appropriate officials and agencies of the Government, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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would be imprudent, as the government must safeguard the security of
the nation. Similarly, to dismiss out of hand Allen's claim of need to
know would, as a practical matter, eliminate his right to apply for
clemency, because his application would not be effective unless he has
access to the classified information from his court record that his
adversaries have invoked.
Under the proposed test, a defendant such as John Allen would fare
well because many of the elements weigh heavily in his favor. First,
access would not compromise an ongoing investigation, as the
materials are nearly two decades old. Second, Allen is planning to
submit a clemency application, which should constitute a valid
purpose for needing access to the information contained in his own
court record. Third, he is serving a life sentence, entitling him to
greater consideration than a defendant with less at stake. In addition,
a government official has leaked portions of the classified materials in
a manner detrimental to Allen's interests,2 41 numerous other
individuals have gained access to the information at issue, and
previous counsel had access to the documents.
Other elements which weigh in favor of granting the defendant's
request are less central to the court's analysis, but they should be
considered as well: the government's generalized assertion that access
could theoretically harm national security should be discounted,
because the government has not articulated a concrete risk; and the
fact that the materials are approximately two decades old indicates a
reduced risk that disclosure to a security-cleared attorney would result
in damage to national security. All of these factors should weigh in
favor of the court's granting access to the classified portions of Allen's
court record.
Two factors, however, would not weigh in Allen's favor: opposition
by a high-level government official and the top secret classification
241. Such statements are especially damaging to a prisoner seeking clemency, as
the prisoner is at the mercy of an executive branch beholden to public opinion. Public
relations play a vital role in a president's decision to grant or deny a clemency
request, illustrated in one case by the defendant's lawyers "acting principally as
lobbyists, working with public relations specialists and individuals-foreign
government officials, prominent citizens, and personal friends of the President-who
had access to the White House." In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 179 F. Supp. 2d 270,
274 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing the strategy of Marc Rich and Pincus Green in their
ultimately successful attempt to obtain clemency from then-President Bill Clinton).
Therefore, a court should explore this element assiduously and more strongly
consider allowing the defendant an adequate response to the harmful publicity. For
example, government officials have caused injury to the reputation of the prisoner
Jonathan Pollard by stating to the press that the contents of his classified records
indicate that Pollard does not deserve any favorable treatment. See, e.g., Angelo M.
Codevilla, Israel's Spy Was Right About Saddam, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1998, at A14;
Letters to the Editor, Justice for the Friendly Spy, Wall St. J., May 14, 1998, at A23;
James Gordon Meek, Spy Pleads for Open Secrets, N.Y. Daily News, Sept. 3, 2003, at
26. His attorneys have a need to know what is contained in the record to combat such
negative public relations, among other reasons.
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level of the materials. The court must balance the factors favorable to
the defendant against those which are unfavorable. For Allen, many
elements weigh heavily on the side of granting access to the classified
materials, while the two on the other side of the scale are less weighty
factors. The court, therefore, should decide to grant the defendant's
request in the case of John Allen.
2. Defendant #2
Mohammad Brown, a convert to Islam, is a pre-conviction
defendant whose attorney is requesting access to materials that a
defendant is ordinarily entitled to access under Brady v. Maryland,242
that is, evidence favorable to the accused. These classified documents
remain in the sole possession of the CIA and the FBI, and the
materials are not specific to Brown's case; rather, the materials relate
to acts allegedly committed by many individuals charged with a
variety of crimes. The government resists on the ground that these
materials contain newly classified information, the disclosure of which
could compromise an ongoing investigation. Furthermore, the
government argues that despite the attorney's security clearance he is
not to be trusted with sensitive information, as the terrorist
organization al-Qaeda is currently monitoring closely his activities and
conversations.
Brown stands accused of committing several acts of terrorism
against the United States and of being an active member of al-Qaeda.
In addition, Brown has openly and repeatedly prayed for the
destruction of the United States and has pledged allegiance to Osama
Bin Laden. The investigation is ongoing, and Brown is awaiting trial.
If convicted, he is eligible for the death penalty. Brown's attorney
seeks access to the materials because he suspects that they may
contain exculpatory evidence, though counsel has given no reason as
to how he reached that conclusion.
The court here must weigh the potential risks to national security
posed by disclosure to an alleged terrorist's counsel against Brown's
rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel. In this case,
nearly every factor of the proposed test weighs in favor of denying
access to his attorney, and the court should deny the request of
Brown's counsel. The factors that weigh most heavily in favor of
denying access are the following: (1) access might compromise the
ongoing investigations associated with Brown's case and other related
cases; (2) the defense has not put forward a concrete reason for
requiring access, as the rationale is based solely on an unsubstantiated
suspicion that the classified materials, which are not exclusively
242. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the prosecution's failure to turn over evidence
favorable to a criminal defendant upon request violates due process if the evidence is
material to either guilt or punishment).
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related to Brown's case, may contain exculpatory materials; (3) there
have been no leaks by government officials; and (4) the defense has
never previously viewed the classified materials sought, which
demonstrates that the information has greater protection than
information which has been disclosed to non-government parties.
A few less weighty factors also do not militate in favor of granting
access. The government's reason for denying access is legitimate, as
Brown and his attorney are being monitored by groups hostile to
America's national security interests. The opposition by numerous
high-level government officials must be respected as well, and the fact
that the materials consist of new pieces of intelligence and the top
secret classification level are further reasons to deny access. In
addition, access by other individuals would not weigh in favor of
granting access to Brown's attorney because the content of the
materials does not relate specifically to Brown. Thus, the fact that
others have viewed the documents does not indicate that any action
adverse to Brown's case has resulted from such access.
The only factor weighing in favor of granting access is the severity
of Brown's potential sentence: the death penalty. As this is a
balancing test, this important factor can tip the scale significantly,
perhaps even outweighing all the other factors under certain
circumstances. In Brown's case, however, one element also weighs
quite heavily against granting access-the probability that disclosure
would compromise an ongoing investigation-and several other
elements also weigh, although only moderately, in favor of denying
access. Therefore, the court should deny the request by Brown's
counsel for access to the classified materials.
3. Defendant #3
William Cramer was recently convicted of spying for North Korea
after the United States government discovered his involvement in
selling information related to U.S. nuclear weapons programs. He has
been sentenced to eight years in prison, although he was merely an
accessory to the crime of espionage and did not directly cause any
grave damage to the United States. Cramer's court record contains
classified statements by a low-level government official who was
intimately involved as a case agent in Cramer's criminal investigation.
In the classified portion of the record, labeled only "confidential," the
government official proposed that Cramer's detention should be
especially long because Cramer will continue to be a threat to national
security for many years to come, owing to Cramer's personal
knowledge of current government secrets. Thus far, neither the
defendant's adversaries nor other individuals have accessed the record
at issue, and therefore there have been no leaks of the information.
The government's sole justification for denying access is that Cramer
and his attorney are long time friends and, as such, the government
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believes that the attorney will feel compelled to share the classified
information with his client, whom the government does not trust with
the sensitive data.
Cramer's attorney is working on a habeas corpus petition and is
hopeful that the judge will vacate Cramer's sentence, on the ground
that at Cramer's sentencing, the prosecution presented evidence
which-in Cramer's attorney's view-the prosecution knew to be
untruthful. The attorney requests access to Cramer's entire court
record, which his current attorneys have never viewed, in order to file
a brief addressing all possible arguments by the government.
This case is somewhat more difficult than those of Allen and
Brown, as several elements work in favor of granting access to the
classified materials, while others do not favor access, and still others
remain in a gray area, leaving the court to render a most difficult
decision. The factor which weighs most heavily in favor of granting
access is that Cramer has a bona fide reason for requiring access,
namely applying for a writ of habeas corpus. Furthermore, the
government has not put forward a concrete justification for denying
access by merely stating that Cramer and his attorney have a close
relationship and that the government fears that counsel will share the
information with his client. Also on the side of granting access are the
facts that the individual opposing access is only a low-level
government official and that the classification level-confidential-is
relatively low.
Those factors which do not favor access by Cramer's attorney are as
follows: the lack of leaks; the lack of access by other individuals; and
the lack of prior access by either defendant or defense counsel.
Although these elements do not affirmatively suggest that the court
should deny access, the presence of these factors would add to the
compelling nature of the defendant's argument for access, while their
absence instead indicates that the need to know may not have been
demonstrated.
Several elements could cut in either direction in Cramer's case.
First, it is uncertain whether access would compromise an ongoing
investigation. Cramer's own criminal case evidently has concluded;
yet the government may still be involved in an ongoing investigation
of his co-conspirators. If so, this factor should militate against
granting access; if not, it should weigh in favor of granting access.
Second, his eight-year term is certainly not as severe as life
imprisonment or a death sentence; however, he is at the beginning of
his term and faces an additional seven years of incarceration. The
court might find that the remaining term is long enough to weigh,
even slightly, in favor of access. Therefore, if all else were equal, this
factor would push the balance in favor of access. Finally, the
materials sought consist of information which is between five- and
ten-years-old. As the materials are still relatively new, Cramer must
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prove that the information lacks potency. If he succeeds, then the
court might decide that this factor weighs on the side of granting
access. However, if Cramer does not meet this burden, then this
factor would weigh in favor of denying access. Although this case is
difficult to decide, the court should probably grant the request of
Cramer's counsel. As illustrated above, the factors weighing in favor
of permitting access outweigh-however slightly-those which do not
favor access.
4. The Ultimate Decision: The Scales Are Balanced Evenly
In a case where the scales are perfectly balanced, a court would be
forced to render an even more difficult decision. Whether a court
decides to deny or grant access, the choice will either potentially
compromise national security by releasing the sensitive data or, on
some level, violate a defendant's rights. However, as the government
alone controls classified information as well as access to such data,
fairness requires that the government be charged with the burden of
establishing why security-cleared counsel should be denied access.
The presumption must be in favor of the defendant because the
government has vast resources available to mount an argument
against access by security-cleared counsel; where the government fails
to meet its burden, access should be granted. Although the
government's interest in preserving national security is certainly
legitimate, it is better to err on the side of preserving the rights of the
defendant than to deny access without cause, thereby unjustifiably
violating the defendant's rights.
CONCLUSION
Constantly permeating our system of criminal justice are two
competing themes: procedural protection of the accused and the
quest for the truth.243 In order to address the plight of the criminal
defendant, courts developed a due process model to ensure that
defendants are given fair trials.2' This formula recognizes higher
stakes in criminal proceedings, most notably the loss of liberty and the
concomitant social stigma, and requires that the scales of justice be
tilted in favor of the accused. 245 Thus, if those scales were perfectly
balanced in a case when a court must determine whether defense
counsel has a need to know, a court should decide to grant access.
However, where the risks to national security outweigh the benefits to
the defendant, a court may choose to deny defense counsel's request.
If applied fairly and objectively in any given case, the proposed test
243. See Darren Allen, Note, The Constitutional Floor Doctrine and the Right to a
Speedy Trial, 26 Campbell L. Rev. 101, 101 (2004).
244. See, e.g., Packer, supra note 58.
245. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 243.
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properly balances a defendant's rights and the government's need to
protect national security by preventing unnecessary disclosure of
classified information.
Fair criminal justice proceedings are, of course, essential to any
system of justice.246 Judicial tendencies to defer to government claims
of national security risks247 undermine the delicate balance between
necessary government secrecy and the need to protect the rights of
criminal defendants. Moreover, the problem of overclassification
threatens to unnecessarily deprive defendants of information which
may be essential to their cases.248 As a democracy depends on the free
flow of information,249 it is disturbing that the need to know
prerequisite to accessing classified information remains undefined in
any meaningful way. A fundamental flaw remains in our system of
justice until our courts adopt an objective test in their analyses of the
criminal defense attorney's "need to know."
246. Clemency and parole are, for most prisoners, the final avenues of relief and
should a fortiori be encompassed by such fairness. See supra notes 64-65. Clemency is
especially vital to our system of criminal justice because it provides the "fail-safe" for
persons to whom gross injustices have been done. See Moore, supra note 61, at 131.
Its necessity is manifest in the fact that almost every constitution in the world
provides for a pardoning power. See id. at 7.
247. See supra notes 16, 205 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
249. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 196 (2003) ("Our democratic principles
require that the American people be informed of the activities of their
Government.").
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